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HENSLEY V. MONTANA STATE FUND:
A SHIFT IN THE GRAND BARGAIN
OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
Brian Hagan*

I. INTRODUCTION
The general purpose of workers’ compensation in Montana “is to provide, without regard to fault, wage loss and medical benefits to a worker
suffering from a work-related injury or disease.”1 The comprehensive system offers a variety of benefits tailored to the circumstances of the injured
party, ranging from prescription coverage2 to burial expenses.3 In Hensley
v. Montana State Fund,4 appellant Susan Hensley received disability benefits as well as medical care, including surgery, for her on-the-job shoulder
injury with Polson Ambulance.5 If not for a change to the Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act) in 2011, Hensley would have qualified for an additional benefit called an impairment award.6 The issue before the Court was
whether section 39-71-703(2) of the Act violated Hensley’s right to equal
protection by not providing her an impairment award.7 The Court held that
classifying injured workers by the severity of their injury rationally related
to the statute’s legitimate objective of providing impairment awards to
those with significant loss of physical function.8
This Note examines the impact the Court’s decision in Hensley has on
Montana law. Specifically, this note assesses the sea change in deference to
legislative cost containment policy and an increasingly fragmented framework of remedies for injured workers, which in turn exposes employers to
unexpected liabilities. In Part II, this Note addresses Hensley’s background,
explaining the pertinent change made to the Act and how the revision affected Hensley’s circumstances. Part II concludes by summarizing the
lower court’s holding. Part III reviews the methodology used by the Montana Supreme Court in deciding the constitutionality of the statute and ex* Brian Hagan, J.D. Candidate, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana, Class of 2023.
1. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-105(1) (2019).
2. § 39-71-727.
3. § 39-71-725.
4. 477 P.3d 1065 (Mont. 2020) (plurality).
5. Id. at 1068–69 (plurality).
6. Id. at 1069–70 (plurality).
7. Id. at 1069 (plurality). See generally MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“No person shall be denied the
equal protection of the laws.”).
8. Hensley, 477 P.3d at 1076, 1078–79 (plurality).
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plores how the plurality opinion and Justice Gustafson’s dissent reached
different conclusions using the same approach. Part IV discusses Justice
Sandefur’s dissent related to the quid pro quo foundation of workers’ compensation law, and Justice Shea’s special concurrence. This Note concludes
by asserting that future litigation is unavoidable until lost benefits underlying the promise of workers’ compensation restore to both employees and
employers.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Impairment Awards and the Revision of the Workers’ Compensation
Act
An impairment award is compensation for a worker’s “loss of physical
function to his or her body.”9 This is distinguishable from any monetary
benefits an injured party may receive related to that worker’s inability to
work.10 The impairment award recognizes the cost of an injury beyond the
workplace.11
Impairment awards are not a new convention of the Montana workers’
compensation benefit structure. These awards have gone under other names,
such as dismemberment indemnity awards or disability benefit awards,12
but the provision of compensation for the loss of physical function unrelated to wage loss co-extends with the history of the Act.13
Before 2011, all injured employees who sustained a permanent bodily
impairment were eligible for an award as compensation under § 39-71703.14 Workers with wage loss as a result of an injury received permanent
partial disability (PPD) awards.15 Workers who did not suffer wage loss as
a result of an injury received impairment awards.16 The difference in these
awards was that injured workers with wage loss received compensation in
the form of an increased permanent impairment rating based on certain factors such as age and type of labor.17 Injured workers with and without wage
loss, however, received a permanent impairment rating.18
The legislature required the use of the latest edition of the American
Medical Association (AMA) Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impair9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Rausch v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 54 P.3d 25, 30 (Mont. 2002).
Id.
Id.
Hensley, 477 P.3d at 1094–96 (Sandefur, J., dissenting).
Id.
MONT CODE ANN. § 39-71-703 (2009).
§ 39-71-703(1).
§ 39-71-703(2).
§ 39-71-703(5).
§ 39-71-703.
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ment (the Guides) for determining the baseline impairment rating.19 The
Guides define an impairment rating as an estimated permanent loss of function, expressed as a percentage, of the whole person not to exceed 100%.20
This percentage, multiplied by two-thirds of the injured worker’s weekly
wages,21 and 375 (an imputed number of weeks that the award covered),
resulted in the award amount given to the worker.22
A 2011 revision to the Act revoked this benefit for a class of injured
workers.23 Beginning with the sixth edition of the Guides, the AMA introduced a new classification system for injured workers: impairment classes.24 These classes were the AMA’s attempt to corral disparate injuries
into five classes of severity ranging from zero (“no functional problem”) to
four (“complete problem with total functional loss”).25 The classes considered injury attributes such as when symptoms presented (“Class 2 = Symptoms with normal activity (independent)”) or objective medical findings
(“Class 4 = Very Severe Problem”).26 The 2011 revised statute, which remains unchanged, provided an impairment award only to those injured
workers in impairment Class Two or greater.27 Such qualified workers then
proceeded to the step which used the percentage permanent impairment rating to calculate their award.28 The result was injured workers with an impairment Class One, even if they had a whole person percentage impairment rating greater than zero, did not receive an award.29
B. The Impact of the Act Revision on Hensley
Susan Hensley’s doctor rated her shoulder injury as a 4% whole person
impairment.30 Using the new grid provided by the Guides, her doctor placed
her in impairment Class One.31 Before the 2011 revision, Hensley would
19. § 39-71-703(1)(b).
20. § 39-71-703; Hensley v. Mont. State Fund, 477 P.3d 1065, 1071 (Mont. 2020) (plurality).
21. § 39-71-703(6).
22. § 39-71-703(3).
23. Hensley, 477 P.3d at 1096 (Sandefur, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 1071 (plurality).
25. Id. at 1070 (plurality) (quoting AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, GUIDES TO THE EVALUATION
OF PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT 11 (6th ed. 2007)).
26. Appellee Montana State Fund’s Answer Brief at 27, Hensley v. Mont. State Fund, 2020 WL
1092296 (Mont. Feb. 10, 2020) (No. DA 19–0523).
27. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-703(2) (2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-703(2) (2019).
28. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-703 (2011) (The number of imputed weeks increased to 400 with
this revision of the statute).
29. § 39-71-703.
30. Hensley, 477 P.3d at 1080 (Gustafson, J., dissenting).
31. Id.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2022

3

Montana Law Review, Vol. 83 [2022], Iss. 1, Art. 5
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\83-1\MON105.txt

162

unknown

Seq: 4

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

10-MAR-22

16:00

Vol. 83

have received a $5,192 impairment award.32 Because of the revision, she
was not entitled to an impairment award.33
Hensley brought suit in the Montana Workers’ Compensation Court
(WCC).34 With the exception of some regulatory matters, the WCC is the
court of original jurisdiction for claims arising under the Act in Montana.35
Hensley asserted the statute violated equal protection because workers in
impairment Class One did not qualify for an award, while those in Class
Two or greater did.36 The WCC granted summary judgment for Montana
State Fund (MSF), the insurer, finding the impairment classes were not situated similarly, and even if they were, the government had a rational basis
for treating them differently.37
The WCC declined to rule on Hensley’s second claim.38 Hensley asserted the statute, as revised, “undercuts the quid pro quo on which the
WCA is based, thereby violating her right to due process under Mont.
Const. art II, § 17.”39 Quid pro quo in workers’ compensation parlance refers to the compromise between employers and employees that keeps the
program sustainable.40 Except for some statutory carve-outs, all Montana
employers must participate in the program.41 Because the Act is the exclusive remedy for injured employees, employers avoid the potential for more
extensive damages if left to defend themselves against tort actions.42 Conversely, injured employees may not receive the significant damage awards
of tort suits, but they know they will always receive something.43 The WCC
declined to rule on the due process claim, reasoning that instead, the district
court should review Hensley’s claim in a tort action.44
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1069 (plurality).
34. Order Granting Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment ¶ 62, Hensley v. Mont. State
Fund, No. 2013-3235 (Mont. Workers’ Comp. Ct. Aug. 22, 2019), https//perma.cc/QFE6-WZXR [hereinafter Order Granting Respondents’ Motion].
35. General Information About the Court, Mont. Dep’t of Labor and Indus. Workers’ Comp. Court,
https://perma.cc/RKM6-KWWH (last visited Nov. 13, 2021).
36. Order Granting Respondents’ Motion, supra note 34, ¶ 23.
37. Id. ¶ 62.
38. Id. ¶ 63.
39. Id. ¶ 23; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 17 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.”).
40. Hensley v. Mont. State Fund, 477 P.3d 1065, 1096 (Mont. 2020) (Sandefur, J., dissenting).
41. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-401 (2019).
42. Stratemeyer v. Lincoln County, 915 P.2d 175, 179 (Mont. 1996) (citations omitted)
(Stratemeyer II); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-411.
43. Stratemeyer II, 915 P.2d at 179.
44. Order Granting Respondents’ Motion, supra note 34, ¶ 63. See also Buerkley v. Aspen Meadows LP, 980 P.2d 1046, 1049 (Mont. 1999) (“[W]here injuries are outside the scope of those covered by
the Act, there is no quid pro quo and, therefore, the exclusive remedy is unavailable as a defense to tort
claims.”).
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED § 39-71703 AND JUSTICE GUSTAFSON’S DISSENT
A. The Montana Supreme Court’s Equal Protection Analysis
On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court, Hensley brought only the
equal protection claim the WCC dismissed.45 The Court uses a three-step
process in reviewing an equal protection claim.46 This section will discuss
how the Court dealt with each step.
First, the Court must “identify the different classes involved and determine whether they are similarly situated.”47 The task is to isolate the factor
that potentially discriminates unconstitutionally and find whether the two
classes are indistinguishable if that factor is removed.48 In Hensley, the factor was impairment class, and the classes were (1) injured workers with an
impairment Class One and (2) injured workers with an impairment Class
Two or greater.49 While the WCC relied on the severity of the injuries in
determining the classes were not similarly situated,50 the plurality in Hensley found that when § 39-71-703(2) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, the
pertinent statute, was construed without the isolated factor (impairment
class), the workers were similarly situated in that they all had an impairment and all were eligible for an award.51
Second, the Court chooses the appropriate level of scrutiny to test the
constitutionality of the statute.52 In Hensley, the Court chose the rational
basis level of scrutiny.53 Court precedent dictates the use of rational basis
scrutiny, the most deferential level of scrutiny, for workers’ compensation
cases because no fundamental right is affected and no suspect classes are
involved.54 Under this level of scrutiny, “a statute is presumed constitutional, and, if the policy behind a law is unclear, a court may consider any
45. Appellant’s Brief at 3–4, Hensley v. Mont. State Fund, 2020 WL 1092294 (Mont. Jan. 10,
2020) (No. DA 19–0523).
46. Henry v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 982 P.2d 456, 461–62 (Mont. 1999).
47. Id. at 461 (citation omitted).
48. Hensley v. Mont. State Fund, 477 P.3d 1065, 1073 (plurality).
49. Id.
50. Order Granting Respondents’ Motion, supra note 34, ¶¶ 55–56.
51. Hensley, 477 P.3d at 1074.
52. Id. at 1073.
53. Id. at 1074.
54. See, e.g., Duane C. Kohoutek, Inc. v. State, 417 P.3d 1105, 1110 (Mont. 2018); Stratemeyer v.
Lincoln County, 855 P.2d 506, 509 (Mont. 1993) (Stratemeyer I). An example of a fundamental right in
Montana is the right to a clean and healthful environment. Sunburst Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc., 165
P.3d 1079, 1092 (Mont. 2007). Some examples of suspect classes are race or national origin. Davis v.
Union Pac. R.R., 937 P.2d 27, 31 (Mont. 1997).
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possible legitimate purpose that the court can conceive to uphold the statute.”55
Third, the Court applies the level of scrutiny when analyzing the stat56
ute. Once the rational basis level of scrutiny is chosen, whether the objective of the statute in question is legitimate is the first hurdle in a two-part
test that follows.57 The plurality noted that the Court previously held impairment awards served a legitimate purpose by recognizing the cost of simply losing a percentage of function in one’s body.58 In considering why the
impairment award eligibility began with Class Two, the plurality foreshadowed its confidence in the Guides by vouching for the “interest in providing
benefits that bear a reasonable relationship to the actual functional loss a
worker sustains.”59 The plurality buttressed this logic by using the Guides’
definition of impairment—a “significant’ deviation or loss.”60
A rational relationship between the classification and the objective of
the statute is the final hurdle in testing constitutionality.61 The plurality
found the statute, as amended, constitutional because using impairment
classes to gauge the severity of an injury had a rational relationship to the
legitimate objective of the statute.62 It found the government had a legitimate interest in ensuring the most severely injured, those who could not
function normally, benefited from impairment awards.63 Although acknowledging the imprecision of the Guides’ impairment classes, the plurality consented to the government’s reliance on the methodology, inferring that
while the impairment classes may have been imperfect, they were the
strongest attempt in an imperfect science to rate the severity of an injury.64
Therefore, the use of impairment class rationally related to the legitimate
objective of providing significantly injured workers impairment awards.65
Ultimately, the plurality held § 39-71-703(2) was constitutional.66

55. William Mac Morris, Note, A Lack of Deference: Rational Basis with Bite in Caldwell v.
MACO Workers’ Compensation Trust, 73 MONT L. REV. 417, 419 (2012).
56. Hensley, 477 P.3d at 1073.
57. Id. at 1074 (citation omitted).
58. Id. at 1075–76 (citing Rausch v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 54 P.3d 25, 30 (Mont. 2002)).
59. Id. at 1076.
60. Id. (quoting AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, GUIDES TO THE EVALUATION OF PERMANENT
IMPAIRMENT 11 (6th ed. 2007)).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1078–79.
63. Id. at 1076.
64. Id. at 1077–78.
65. Id. at 1078.
66. Id. at 1077–79.
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B. Justice Gustafson’s Dissent
In her dissent, Justice Gustafson raised two arguments as to why the
plurality opinion was faulty. First, Justice Gustafson asserted there was no
legitimate objective in the statute, as amended, because revoking benefits
from one class—Class One—to tailor them toward a different class—Class
Two or greater—was found unallowable in Caldwell v. MACo Workers’
Compensation Trust.67 The second argument asserted that the admittedly
unverified nature of the impairment classes implied an arbitrary methodology.68
The Court in Caldwell held that revoking training benefits from those
eligible for Social Security was arbitrary because age does not rationally
relate to a worker’s “ability or willingness to return to work.”69 MSF, as
amicus, argued the associated cost savings enabled the workers’ compensation program to tailor benefits to those with the greatest need.70 The Caldwell Court rejected what it hinted as being age discrimination, and found no
precedent for such a policy.71 In contrast, Justice Baker’s dissent agreed
that providing limited resources to those of working age, rather than those
statutorily recognized as retired, was a legitimate government objective.72
She found that using eligibility for Social Security as a “line of demarcation” rationally related to such an objective.73
In Hensley, Justice Gustafson applied focus consistent with Caldwell
on the cost containment considerations of the revision to § 39-71-703(2).74
In contrast, the plurality opinion, penned by Justice Baker, focused on (1)
the objective of the statute as revised—to provide impairment awards to
injured workers with significant loss of function and (2) the classification
system used to distinguish such workers based on the relative severity of
injury.75 Hensley’s departure from Caldwell signals that this Court is amenable to cost-containment as justification for disparate treatment in situations where a rational “line of demarcation”76 separates degrees of need.
67. Id. at 1079 (Gustafson, J., dissenting) (citing Caldwell v. MACo Workers’ Comp. Trust, 256
P.3d 923, 929–30 (Mont. 2011)).
68. Id. at 1090–93 (Gustafson, J., dissenting).
69. 256 P.3d at 931.
70. Amicus Brief at 15–23, Caldwell v. MACo Workers’ Comp. Trust, 2010 WL 4733968 (Mont.
Nov. 12, 2010) (No. DA 10-0427).
71. Caldwell, 256 P.3d at 930–31.
72. Id. at 933 (Baker, J., dissenting) (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-710 (“If a claimant . . .
receives social security retirement benefits or is eligible to receive or is receiving full social security
retirement benefits or retirement benefits from a system that is an alternative to social security retirement, the claimant is considered to be retired . . . .”)).
73. Id. at 933.
74. Hensley v. Mont. State Fund, 477 P.3d 1065, 1087–88 (Mont. 2020) (Gustafson, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 1075–78.
76. Caldwell, 256 P.3d at 933 (Baker, J., dissenting).
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Justice Gustafson’s dissent also observed that the Guides acknowledged its new impairment class system “as yet unverified.”77 She argued
that if a scientific methodology of classifying injured workers was awaiting
validation studies, such a methodology remained arbitrary.78 The law of
Montana seeks to protect its citizens from arbitrary government action,79
but how courts define arbitrariness determines a ruling. “The Ninth Circuit
commonly adds to the arbitrary and capricious standard some combination
of the following: unsupported by substantial evidence, erroneous with respect to a question of law, and bad faith.”80 The Montana Supreme Court
has held that a classification can be imperfect and still not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Montana Constitution.81
The Guides used in Hensley admitted that impairment and disability
“are complex concepts that are not yet amenable to evidence-based definition,” and the plurality acknowledged that the methodology was “less than
precise.”82 Justice Gustafson noted that Montana was the only state currently using impairment classes to calculate impairment awards.83 Notwithstanding the imprecise nature of measuring severity, the plurality was satisfied that the impairment classes evolved from objective medical findings
and opined that “[r]ational distinctions may be made with substantially less
than mathematical exactitude.”84 Ultimately, the Court gave deference to
(1) the legislature’s presumably good faith attempt at tailoring awards to the
neediest and (2) the expertise of the American Medical Association, which
had enough confidence in the class system to insert it into the sixth edition
of the Guides.85
IV.

THE QUID PRO QUO FOUNDATION
LAW

OF

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

The holding of the plurality begs the following question: What remedy
do injured workers have when placed in impairment Class One? The case of
Gary Stratemeyer may offer clues. On May 4, 1990, Deputy Sheriff Gary
Stratemeyer responded to a suicide attempt call near Libby, Montana.86
77. Hensley, 477 P.3d at 1091 (Gustafson, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 1091–93.
79. Godfrey v. Mont. Fish & Game Comm’n, 631 P.2d 1265, 1267 (Mont. 1981).
80. George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: The Arbitrary and Capricious Rule Under Siege, 39 CATH. U. L.
REV. 133, 150 (1989) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
81. Arneson v. State, 864 P.2d 1245 (1993).
82. Hensley, 477 P.3d at 1077 (quoting AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, GUIDES TO THE EVALUATION OF PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT 11 (6th ed. 2007)).
83. Id. at 1083 (Gustafson, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 1077–78 (quoting Ward v. Johnson, 277 P.3d 1216, 1221 (Mont. 2012)).
85. Id. at 1076–78.
86. Stratemeyer v. Lincoln County, 855 P.2d 506, 507 (Mont. 1993) (Stratemeyer I).
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When he arrived at the scene, he found a girl who had shot herself in the
head being cradled by her father.87 Deputy Stratemeyer took the girl from
her father’s arms and attempted to administer CPR.88 After escorting the
ambulance to the hospital, Deputy Stratemeyer learned of the girl’s death.89
In the following weeks, Deputy Stratemeyer could not continue working
because he was tormented by the memory of tearing the girl from her father’s arms in the last moments of her life.90
Because Montana’s statutory definition of “injury” contemplates only
physical injury,91 benefits of the Act were unavailable to Deputy
Stratemeyer for his mental anguish.92 As a result, he brought a tort action
claim against Lincoln County, his former employer, for “failure to train,
counsel, and debrief him following the incident.”93 Lincoln County attempted to quash the lawsuit on the grounds that the Act was the exclusive
remedy for work-related injuries in Montana, a remedy that was unavailable
to Stratemeyer in his first cause of action.94 Indeed, the right to sue an
employer for injury in Montana does not exist if the employer “provides
immediate coverage under the Workmen’s Compensation laws.”95 However, as discussed in Part II, the exclusive remedy provision of the Act is an
essential component of the quid pro quo that is its foundation.96 That quid
pro quo includes a guaranteed benefit to the worker.97 Without that quid
pro quo, the Court in Stratemeyer II held there is no exclusive remedy, “and
the employer is thus exposed to potential tort liability.”98
The holding in Stratemeyer II directly applies to Hensley’s situation.
While unrelated to the plurality’s holding in Hensley, perhaps the most
noteworthy outcome of the statutory revision is the erosion to workers’
compensation’s exclusive remedy. Justice Sandefur’s dissent cautions that
excluding one class of injured parties must be considered against the promise of the quid pro quo.99 In this sense, the promise fails because one part of
the quid pro quo is to guarantee payment for all physical injuries, including
87. Id. at 507–08.
88. Id. at 508.
89. Id.
90. Stratemeyer v. Lincoln County, 915 P.2d 175, 176–77 (Mont. 1996) (Stratemeyer II);
Stratemeyer I, 855 P.2d at 508.
91. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-119 (2019).
92. Stratemeyer I, 855 P.2d at 509.
93. Stratemeyer II, 915 P.2d at 176–77.
94. Id. at 179–80; Stratemeyer I, 855 P.2d at 509.
95. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 16.
96. See supra Part II.
97. Stratemeyer II, 915 P.2d at 179.
98. Id. at 180.
99. Hensley v. Mont. State Fund, 477 P.3d 1065, 1097 (Mont. 2020) (Sandefur, J., dissenting).
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those that would fall under impairment Class One.100 Hensley, however, did
not raise this issue on appeal.101 As Justice Shea quips in his special concurrence, “[t]he only one to make that argument in this case is Justice
Sandefur.”102 The Court will not “consider new arguments or legal theories
. . . on appeal.”103 Therefore, the Court could not consider the argument.104
In Stratemeyer II, the Court held that because workers with mental injuries
were outside the boundaries of the Act, a tort action remedy was available
against the employer.105 As a consequence of the Hensley plurality affirming § 39-71-703(2) and its placement of impairment Class One workers
outside the boundaries of the Act, it follows that tort action claims are now
available to them for the functional loss suffered due to their workplace
injuries. Should the courts deny employees their right to an employer tort
suit for impairment Class One injuries, a conflict arises where citizens are
both barred a remedy within the Act and simultaneously barred from tort
actions against employers who provide coverage under the Act.106 The slippery slope suggested here is that each time the legislature removes a benefit
for cost-containment purposes, the due process for workplace injury becomes more piecemeal and less exclusive until the purpose of workers’
compensation insurance becomes moot. Justice Shea’s special concurrence,
likely in recognition of these consequences of the statute, appeared to invite
the quid pro quo argument to the Court, and virtually vouched for its success.107
For now, injured employees will absorb the costs of Class One impairment awards. The injustice decried in Justice Sandefur’s dissent,108 Justice
Gustafson’s dissent,109 and the appellant’s brief110 is that cost-savings are
being recognized at the expense of those in impairment Class One. Justice
Gustafson noted the prediction that the impairment award eligibility change
100. Id. at 1100.
101. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 45, at 3, 5, 26–27.
102. Hensley, 477 P.3d at 1079 (Shea, J., specially concurring).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 915 P.2d 175, 179–80 (Mont. 1996) (Stratemeyer II).
106. See MONT. CONST. art. II, § 16 (stating “No person shall be deprived of this full legal redress
for injury incurred in employment for which another person may be liable except as to fellow employees
and his immediate employer who hired him if such immediate employer provides coverage under the
Workmen’s Compensation Laws of this state.”) (emphasis added).
107. Hensley, 477 P.3d at 1079 (Shea, J., specially concurring) (“Considering only the arguments as
they were presented to the Workers Compensation Court and to this Court, I agree with the Court’s
ultimate conclusion that, in this particular case, Hensley has not met her burden of demonstrating that
§ 39-71-703(2), MCA, violates equal protection. I therefore concur in the result affirming the WCC.”).
108. Id. at 1100 (Sandefur, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 1087 (Gustafson, J., dissenting).
110. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 45, at 31 (impairment class is a “cost–cutting carrot”).
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would realize a cost-savings of $8 million per annum.111 The fiscal note for
House Bill 334—the bill that added impairment Class of Two or greater to
the eligibility criteria—noted that “approximately 1,600 of the 3,000 injured workers per year who receive an impairment rating less than Class
Two but have no wage loss would no longer receive an impairment
award.”112 Susan Hensley’s predicted impairment award, but for the eligibility change, was $5,192.113 Multiplying the estimated number of workers
affected by the change (1,600) by Hensley’s lost award ($5,000) arrives at
the same cost-savings estimate the fiscal note anticipated: eight million dollars per annum. These savings do not exist in a vacuum. They come in the
form of 1,600 people like Susan Hensley, who suffered a “glenoid labral
tear of her left shoulder”114 and a permanent, uncompensated loss of function in her body due to a workplace injury.115 By recognizing the distinct
loss associated with permanent whole person impairment but denying a
remedy for such a loss, the Act shifts the cost of such injuries on to the very
employees that are injured. Montana workers’ compensation lawyers should
note their clients’ impairment class, as a potentially lucrative replacement
source of compensation may now be available in the form of tort actions
against employers.
The balance of cost-savings is accomplished by shifting costs of impairment awards from being applied evenly across all employers (in the
form of insurance premiums) to the employers who have a litigious injured
worker with an impairment Class One (in the form of settlement or damages). Deputy Stratemeyer brought a claim against Lincoln County when he
was ineligible for workers’ compensation for his mental injury.116 The very
existence of Hensley proves that some injured workers with no wage loss,
and an impairment Class One, will bring a claim to exact their remedy.
Employers with impairment Class One lawsuits will find themselves paying
workers’ compensation insurance premiums plus the very legal costs, settlements, and damages the Act is supposed to protect them from, while other
employers benefit from the associated cost-savings. For this reason, a quid
pro quo argument brought to the Court by an employer is just as likely.

111. Hensley, 477 P.3d at 1088 (Gustafson, J., dissenting).
112. MONT. STATE FUND, GENERALLY REVISE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, H.R. FISCAL NOTE NO.
HB 334, at 4 (Mont. 2011).
113. Hensley, 477 P.3d at 1080 (Gustafson, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 1069.
115. Id. at 1080 (Gustafson, J., dissenting).
116. Stratemeyer v. Lincoln County, 915 P.2d 175, 176–77 (Mont. 1996) (Stratemeyer II).
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V. CONCLUSION
The plurality in Hensley found § 39-71-703(2) to pass rational basis
muster, evidencing a shift to a more deferential Court than in 2012, when
Caldwell was decided. Consequently, the statute remains in conflict with
the fundamental promise to employers that the Act will shield them from
litigation and to employees that the Act will compensate them for their
loss.117 The result is the shifting of class one impairment award costs from
all employers to only those employers litigated against, and to employees
who fail to seek or obtain a remedy in tort. The implication within Justice
Shea’s concurrence is that an argument exists to persuade the Court to hold
this statute unconstitutional.118 The contradiction between the new costing
shift and the implied quid pro quo purpose of the Act suggests this area of
law will remain unsettled until that argument arrives.

117. Hensley, 477 P.3d at 1100 (Sandefur, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 1079 (Shea, J., specially concurring).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol83/iss1/5

12

